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An Account of Emotional Specificity in Classic–
Romantic Music
Jeffrey Swinkin
Many, if not most, contemporary philosophers of music contend that the 
musical expression of an emotion does not depend upon the perceiver feel-
ing that emotion.1 That is, while these scholars do not necessarily deny that 
emotional responses to music are valuable, even inevitable, they do not view 
such responses as properly part of the emotional content of the work itself, 
or even properly part of an aesthetic experience of the work (as opposed to 
a more informal one). Some argue this on the basis that musical emotions 
lack intentional objects: if a piece expresses sadness, for example, this could 
not consist in the listener feeling sad for the piece gives him nothing to be 
sad about.2 Others invoke the problematic paradox of negative emotion: if 
music really made us feel sad, why would we want to listen to it? (Davies 
[1997] and Levinson [1997] explore this issue.) Still others observe that pieces 
often evoke feelings they do not express and vice versa; as Goodman states, 
“whatever emotion may be excited [by music] is seldom the one expressed” 
(1976:47). As a consequence, even when the emotions expressed by the music 
and those felt by the listener happen to coincide, the latter are nonetheless 
incidental to musical expression. Equally incidental is what composers feel 
when they compose. As Peter Kivy avers, “It is unthinkable that I should 
amend my characterization of the opening bars of Mozart’s  G–minor 
Symphony (K. 550) as somber . . . if I were to discover evidence of Mozart’s 
happiness . . . during its composition” (1989:14–15). 
While none of these arguments is ironclad, collectively they make a 
compelling case for the fundamental separation of musical expression and 
arousal. Departing from this axiomatic distinction, I will attempt to dem-
onstrate precisely how music possesses emotional content, how emotional 
qualities arise from (if not completely inhere in) musical form and structure. 
In the process, I hope to demonstrate that musical emotions need not be of 
the most general sort, such as joy and sorrow (what Kivy designates “gar-
den–variety” emotions) but may at times be subtle, specific, and “cognitively 
complex.”3 This view runs counter to those of Eduard Hanslick, Peter Kivy, 
and Susanne Langer, to cite three prominent aestheticians. However, rather 
than dismiss their ideas, which are extremely valuable in their own right, I 
hope to assimilate them into what I feel is a more satisfying theory of musical 
emotion—one that accounts for more nuanced shades of emotion than these 
theorists allow. In what follows, I shall neither comprehensively survey the 
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published positions on musical emotion nor offer an entirely original theory; 
rather, I shall attempt to synthesize these well–known stances toward musical 
emotion, incorporating my own, music–analytic approach (which utilizes 
formal, motivic, Schenkerian, and implication–realization methods). My 
two related aims are (a) to account for the multiple musical parameters and 
structural levels that generate emotional content; (b) to explicate the means 
by which music in certain instances is able to convey specific emotions. 
The following is not a universally applicable theory but rather an account 
of the mechanisms of expression primarily within Germanic music of the late 
eighteenth and early–to mid–nineteenth centuries (what I shall henceforth 
designate “classic–romantic music”). The means by which such music gener-
ates emotional content are especially susceptible to theorization because, 
as I will argue, this music generally boasts clearly delineated themes with 
distinctive emotional profiles,4 and also because thematic development in 
this style elaborates and modifies themes and their corresponding emotions 
in relatively transparent ways. Granted, a theory of musical emotion based 
on such a relatively narrow range of repertoire will inevitably be of somewhat 
limited application. This predicament, however, cannot be avoided, for the 
simple reason that music of different styles engenders emotion in different 
ways (although some techniques, of course, are held in common). Hence, 
theories of musical emotion must be situated historically, however tempting 
it may be to attempt a universal theory. That said, my theoretical stance is not 
entirely limited to the classic–romantic paradigm on which it is based, no 
more so than such music itself exists in a historical vacuum. The emotional 
processes of Beethoven’s music, for example, may be more patent and potent 
than those of some other repertories, but they are also somewhat continuous 
with those of other repertories. That is to say, we might hold up Beethoven’s 
music as a particularly lucid example of how music might mean, and thus 
as a window into some aspects of the emotional content and processes in 
other music, even where these are somewhat different or less salient.
I should also clarify that the listener I envision here is one thoroughly 
immersed in the conventions of classic–romantic repertoire, receptive to 
its personified contours (able to empathize with its anthropomorphic ele-
ments) and capable of listening “structurally,”5 of following a linear musical 
argument and its attendant emotional niceties. I do not believe that the 
emotional elements I will adumbrate are “built into” configurations of 
pitch and rhythm, such that anyone perceiving such configurations will 
by necessity perceive musical emotion. Rather, musical emotion arises 
from the intersection of sounding music and the perceptions of a listener 
equipped with certain cognitive and emotional predispositions. In other 
words, emotional elements, while in some sense present in (correlated with 
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and delimited by) musical sound rather than imposed willy–nilly from 
without, are nonetheless only potentially present—to become manifest, they 
require a stylistically competent, structurally comprehending, and empathic 
listener.6 That said, there are degrees of emotional apprehension, such that 
a listener lacking the ability, for example, to follow a musical argument—to 
attend to music–structural unfolding—might nonetheless glean emotional 
content from other parameters, such as foreground gestures and topics, as 
I will discuss. 
With these caveats in mind, I proceed to consider the three crucial com-
ponents of musically embodied emotion mentioned above: first convention 
and contour, and then formal process.
Convention and Contour
Kivy (1989) cites convention and contour as two sources of musical emotion. 
By the former he means expressive codes with widely recognized denota-
tions. The most central among these are the major and minor modes, which 
have been understood to correlate with the positive and negative sides of 
the emotional spectrum. Insofar as these modes govern entire pieces, they 
can be understood to generate broad emotional contexts within which 
more detailed emotional cues occur. Other conventional idioms are more 
localized and more dependent on style. For example, the topics (topoi) of 
the classical period possess relatively standardized emotional connotations: 
horn calls (horn fifths) commonly express aggressiveness; Sturm und Drang 
angst; the lament bass (held over from the Baroque) ceremonious grief; the 
Mannheim rocket intense expectancy; the sigh (Seufzer) motif plaintive 
longing, and so forth.7 
The “contour” theory, conversely, “explains the expressiveness of music 
by the congruence of musical ‘contour’ with the structure of [human] expres-
sive features and behavior” (Kivy 1989:77). Here Kivy draws a distinction 
between expressing emotion and being expressive of emotion (1989:12–13). 
To cite his paradigmatic example, a Saint Bernard is not necessarily sad, but 
to a human observer his countenance is nonetheless expressive of sadness 
because it resembles the countenance of a person when he or she is sad. 
By contrast, the dour countenance of a person who is in fact sad expresses 
sadness—his countenance directly reflects how he is feeling. Music, Kivy 
submits, is more like the Saint Bernard than the sad person: a piece is ex-
pressive of sadness not because it is sad in any literal sense—nor because it 
expresses the sad feelings of the composer or evokes them in the listener—but 
because its contour closely resembles the physical forms we associate with 
sadness.8 A drooping façade or posture, whether of a Saint Bernard, flower, 
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or melody—say, one in a minor key and replete with descending leaps, as 
in the first two measures of Mozart’s Mass in C minor, K. 427—is likely to 
convey a negative emotional quality, a dejected state; the opposite holds for 
an uplifted façade. In short, music is expressive partially due to its isomorphic 
relation to animate features.9 
Emotional contour is not confined to melodic physiognomy. We 
also detect emotion in musical behaviors that are analogous to human 
behaviors—in particular, to physical gesture and vocal utterance. As to the 
former, just as we might infer an emotion from a person’s gait, so might we 
from a musical gait, as conjured by tempo and rhythm. To take an obvious 
example, a slow tempo commonly intimates a sluggish gait, from which we 
infer sadness (especially if conjoined with the minor mode). On a more 
local level, much music is replete with gestures that can be understood as 
analogous to human ones; this is particularly true of the mature classical 
style, with its heterogeneous phrase rhythms and detailed articulations. 
Regarding vocality, Kivy states that we hear sadness in music when we “hear 
musical sounds as appropriate to the expression of sadness . . . when we hear 
them as human utterances, and perceive the features of these utterances as 
structurally similar to our own voices when we express our own sadness in 
speech” (1989:51).10
In short, whereas musical conventions bear a relatively arbitrary rela-
tion to emotion, musical contours are congruent with the human behaviors 
indicative of emotion. Kivy, however, is careful to note that the boundary 
between the two categories is permeable: some conventions are rooted in 
contour–resemblances; conversely, many contour–resemblances, often slight 
in themselves, accrue expressive force by dint of long–standing associa-
tion—by becoming conventionalized. The minor mode, for example, may at 
first have expressed melancholy due to the fact that its mediant is a semitone 
lower than that of major and so has a comparatively drooping contour, but 
it has acquired expressive weight due to the influence of association over 
many years.11 The sigh figure, to take a more localized example, is probably 
also expressive by virtue of both contour and convention. Kivy suggests that 
this figure might express sadness “by analogy to human expression,” but that 
its intensity depends on convention: “ . . . the figure has been associated, 
since time out of mind, with intense rather than transient and shallow grief ” 
(1989:78). In the cases of minor mode and sigh figure, then, a somewhat 
faint resemblance to human form amounts to a marked expression due to 
conventional association. Since a fine line separates convention and con-
tour—or put differently, since they often operate in tandem—it is frequently 
difficult if not impossible to discern which, if either, is more responsible for 




Kivy’s argument is compelling to a point but it does not sufficiently account 
for the influence of music–formal procedures upon affective conventions 
and contours. O’Dey notes that “Kivy’s work has been criticized for focusing 
exclusively on small–scale musical details and for neglecting the expressive 
potential of overall form” (2000:10). A theory of musical emotion that does 
not sufficiently acknowledge the role of form will likely fail to discern many 
emotional particularities in musical works. 
Enter Hanslick and Langer: both assert, in similar ways, that musical 
expression derives from formal unfolding. Hanslick denies that music is 
capable of representing specific feelings; these, he claims, can only arise 
in conjunction with specific thoughts and circumstances, which music is 
incapable of denoting. He does maintain, however, that music can repre-
sent the more general dynamic qualities associated with and capable of 
modifying emotions. Music can do so because such qualities are perfectly 
compatible with purely musical processes—the “tonally moving forms” 
that, for Hanslick, are the sole content of music. That is, such qualities 
are susceptible “to audible changes in strength, motion, and proportion” 
(1891:10).13 To paraphrase Hanslick, music can represent whispering, albeit 
not the whispering of love; it can represent violence, albeit not the violence 
of conflict. Music “can only express the various accompanying adjectives and 
never the substantive” (9).14 It is fine, he suggests, to extrapolate particular 
emotions from these abstract qualities, to imagine concrete scenarios, but 
one must not conflate the two.15 
Langer has likewise argued that the dynamic processes of music are 
isomorphic with the general forms of emotional experience. Echoing 
Hanslick, she enumerates various processes or patterns that music shares 
with emotions, such as those of “motion and rest, of tension and release, of 
agreement and disagreement, preparation, fulfillment, excitation, sudden 
change, and so on” (Langer 1957:184–185). These dynamics are common 
to many if not most emotions.16 In fact, Langer argues, some emotions 
we consider oppositional might actually partake of the same or a similar 
dynamic pattern.17 Both happy and sad conditions, for example, often as-
sume the form of initiation—climax—denouement (whether over short or 
long time–spans). Like Hanslick, she restricts expression to these general 
states, claiming that music can convey only the structure, not substance, 
of emotion: “For what music can actually reflect is only the morphology of 
feeling” (1957:238, her italics). Consequently, music is an “unconsummated 
symbol”: it is expressive and significant, but not of any one thing in particular. 




For Kivy, Hanslick, and Langer, then, musical emotion is synonymous 
with neither self–expression nor arousal. Rather, it is something that 
resides in the musical substance itself—the musical sound, whether actual 
or imagined, as denoted by notation. For all three, emotion arises from 
isomorphic correspondences: for Kivy, between musical contour and the 
external, demonstrable dimensions of feeling; for Hanslick and Langer, 
between musical processes and the dynamic structure of feeling—between 
music and the way feelings feel. Hence, Kivy allows only for the expression 
of concrete, “garden–variety” emotions, since these are the only ones infer-
able from physical contours, while Hanslick and Langer allow only for the 
expression of generalized emotional dynamics.
These two views are not incompatible, for, when combined, they can 
account for different dimensions of any given musical emotion: on Kivy’s 
view, contours and conventions indicate the physical or behavioral profile 
of the emotion; on Hanslick’s and Langer’s view, formal processes indicate 
the inner experience of an emotion, the way an emotion unfolds in time. Far 
from being mutually exclusive, it would seem that both dimensions would 
necessarily operate and reinforce one another in any instance of musical 
expression. 
Beethoven, Piano Concerto in C Minor: Opening
Examining a brief passage from Beethoven’s C minor piano concerto will 
serve to consolidate my argument to this point. The opening thematic idea 
(Example 1, measures 114–117), with its minor key, forte dynamic, and stark 
octave doublings, possesses a severe quality; moreover, the fanfare topic, 
sforzando–accented G, and hammer blows in the last two measures suggest 
a somewhat aggressive stance. From these conventions and contours we may 
infer the emotion of anger—or perhaps, to be a bit more specific, bellicose 
anger.18 To be sure, this description is too reductive to precisely capture the 
emotional content of this passage as I perceive it (much less the emotional 
nuances others may hear). Here we encounter the inevitable problem of 
applying words to music, of how language is inadequate for fully describing 
musical emotion (or perhaps emotion generally), a problem I can hardly 
resolve here. Suffice to say, if we wish to talk about musical meaning at all, we 
must learn to live with the ineluctable disparity between words and music. 
However, two tactics can mitigate this disparity. First, in explaining musical 
emotion we should strive to employ language sensitively and artistically in 
order to bridge the language–music gap at least to some degree. Indeed, we 
can look to nineteenth–century critics such as E. T. A. Hoffman and A. B. 
Marx as models in this regard, for their hermeneutic readings often embody 
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or exemplify some of the aesthetic qualities of the music they discuss. Bent 
(1994:141–142) points out, for example, that Hoffman, in his celebrated 1810 
review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, at one point withholds verbs in his 
description of the opening in order to convey the music’s sense of “breathless 
orientation” (Bent’s words). To take a much more recent critic, Adorno, ac-
cording to Michael Spitzer, often writes in a manner analogous to the music 
it treats—it exemplifies the very musical qualities to which he refers. For 
example, in referring to Adorno’s remarks on Beethoven’s String Quartet in 
A minor, op. 132, Spitzer claims, “This . . . synergy between the content and 
medium of representation, whereby criticism mimics qualities of its object, 
is absolutely typical of Adorno’s philosophical aesthetics. Here Adorno’s 
procedure is most pronounced in the late–Beethovenian fragmentation of 
his argument, which unfolds as cryptically as the actual quartet” (2006:39). 
Second, and more crucially, our descriptions of emotions, however imperfect, 
will derive a measure of objective—or better, intersubjective—validity from 
their basis in objectively present musical elements (conventional, contoural, 
and formal) as derived from astute observation and analysis.
Returning to our example, the next phrase (measures 118–121) features 
a homophonic, chorale–like texture/topic, which connotes harmonious 
communality and spirituality. This phrase thus transcends or assuages the 
anger of the previous phrase, especially given its piano dynamic and the trill 
figures in measure 120 that partially obscure the hammer–stroke rhythms 
of the left hand, attenuating their angularity. Yet this phrase is not entirely 
ameliorative: tension is still evident, especially in the pungent dissonance 
on the downbeat of measure 119, arising both from the minor ninth between 
Ab and G (within each hand) and from the Ab itself, which, as   
 	
ˆ 6  in a minor 
key, has an inherently yearning or anxious quality. However, this tension is 
now more internally contained than acted out.
The anger is further assuaged in measures 122–123, which evince a 
contemplative stance toward the anger as well as a degree of emotional 
distance. This is because the fanfare—a vestige of which is present in the 
bass voice (circled in the example)—is somewhat eviscerated by its piano 
and legato treatment and by the fact that its final third (Eb–G) is transformed 
to a fourth (Eb–Ab). This figure thus delineates a first–inversion triad, which 
is somewhat milder than the root–position triad of the original fanfare. As 
the fanfare is softened, so is the anger with which it was previously associ-
ated; as it is modified (intervalically), so the anger is modified and redi-
rected. The more reflective or contemplative stance is also evident in the 
rhythmic elongation: whereas the initial fanfare figure (the triad) occupied 
one measure plus one beat, this one is expanded to two full measures. 
Likewise with the fifth–motive (G–F–Eb–D–C) in the right hand: origi-
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nally occurring over five quarter notes (measures 115–1161), it now occurs 
over eight (measures 122–123). This expansion is the result both of the 
motive being embellished and of starting prematurely—it now coincides 
with the start of the fanfare rather than following it as before. In stark 
contrast to the terse, tense opening, both the bass and melody spin more 
leisurely, more lyrical lines. Consequently, this passage intimates a pro-
tracted, linear thought process, a more considered stance, rather than, as in 
the theme, an erratic emotional outburst.19 This holds even if, given the 
nature of music, the precise content of this thought process must remain 
“unconsummated.” However, the musical persona has not achieved complete 
emotional detachment—pain or tension is still clearly evident, as in the 
poignant dissonance (accented passing tone D) on the downbeat of measure 
123 and in the continued emphasis on   
 	
ˆ 6  (Ab in the bass, measure 123).
Measures 124–128 initially continue this contemplative stance but grow 
increasingly restless: each sequential statement is a fourth higher, each one 
expressing a more intense yearning than the previous, as if one finds herself 
unable to maintain the emotional distance needed to reflect rationally upon 
the initial emotional state, and is inexorably devolving into it. Indeed, the 
statement beginning in measure 126 is unable to retain its composure—it 
exceeds the two–measure boundary established by the previous two state-
ments, its accelerated activity in measure 127 (F–Eb–D–C of the piano’s bass) 
spills into measure 128.20 Then, the sforzando–accented G of measure 129, 
as a salient reference to that of measure 115, brings us full circle and seems 
to forebode a recurrence of the initial anger. Such a recurrence, however, is 
not to be found in the next statement of the theme starting in measure 138, 
which is garbed in the relative major and accompanied by buoyant eighth 
notes. This thematic statement perhaps consolidates the positive perspective 
toward which the persona was striving in measures 122–130, despite the 
threat of emotional regression in measure 129.
To summarize, the emotion of bellicose anger is derived from conven-
tion and contour. However, formal dynamics subsequently come to the fore, 
developing both the theme and its concomitant emotion. That is, as the theme 
is modified by the formal processes of elongation (augmentation), sequential 
repetition, (sub)phrase expansion, and return, the emotional correlate of the 
theme (anger) is likewise modified by the experiential correlates of those 
formal processes; in this context, these seem to be, respectively, contem-
plation, intensification, spilling–over (losing composure), and regression 
(review Example 1). These dynamics modify the basic mood in more fluid 
and subtle ways than conventions or contours by themselves could. 
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This example demonstrated how an emotion may be musically specified. 
In a moment, I will build upon this idea, exploring the role of tonal and 
motivic structure in music–emotional specification. First, however, I would 
like to step back and consider the crux of our issue more generally.
Music–Emotional Specificity
What is the relation of musical emotion to ordinary, non–musical emotion? 
We may adduce two polarized views. At one extreme, a musical emotion is 
considered not fundamentally different from the corresponding emotion 
one experiences in life, outside of music. At the other, a musical emotion is 
considered sui generis, uniquely and irreducibly musical, such that the musi-
cal experience of anger, for instance, is only nominally related to the anger 
we experience outside of music. The first view runs counter to the intuition 
that a musical emotion, if not wholly unique, is surely somewhat distinct 
from and perhaps more refined than a non–musical emotion. The second 
view runs counter to the intuition that musical emotions are not completely 
removed from the emotions we experience in non–musical settings—that 
music does not exist in its own, rarified realm, entirely divorced from ordi-
nary experience. I think we need to mediate between these polarized views, 
regarding musical emotion as neither commonplace nor sui generis; that is, 
I regard musical emotion as at once musically specific and also related to 
everyday emotional experience.
Classic–romantic music commonly performs such a mediation. In 
such music, the theme, due to its relative conventionality and topicality, 
will usually establish a basic, relatively general emotion. (Of course, most 
pieces have multiple themes, with each one typically expressing a different 
emotion.) The opening theme of Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony expresses 
bucolic contentment, that of Liszt’s Piano Sonata demonic anger, and 
that of the Finale of Mahler’s Ninth Symphony funereal melancholy. As is 
evident from the adjectives “bucolic,” “demonic,” and “funereal,” even these 
emotions are not entirely general or “garden–variety”—most of us experi-
ence contentment at some point, but not necessarily bucolic contentment. 
An emotion presented so coarsely as to elicit no such qualification would 
rarely appear in the sophisticated repertoire under consideration here. 
Still, these emotions are relatively general in serving as emotional points of 
reference within their respective pieces, to be rendered even more specific 
by subsequent musical processes.
Indeed, once the theme has been stated and its process of development 
and variation begins, the emotion expressed by the theme will likewise be 
developed and varied.21 That is, it will be subjected to formal processes that 
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serve to specify the emotion in two, interrelated ways. First, the (relatively) 
commonplace musical emotion as established by contour and convention 
is progressively wed to the formal processes and musical events by which 
it is shaped, such that, ultimately, it is indelibly imprinted by musical 
qualities. In other words, an emotion that begins as an extension of, or 
reference to, common experience is progressively rendered more specifically 
musical—increasingly inseparable from its musical instantiation. Second, it 
would seem that the development of a theme would conduce to even greater 
emotional generality, since these formal processes, according to Hanslick 
and Langer, are isomorphic with the general dynamics of experience. Yet, 
in my view, this is not the case, for the simple reason that these processes 
and their experiential correlates occur in conjunction with or in relation to 
a theme and its basic expressive signification and hence serve to specify or 
modify that signification, whether demonstrably or subtly. In other words, 
when the theme is developed, its emotional correlate is colored by various 
dynamics, by varying degrees of tension, delay, fulfillment, dissolution, and 
so on; in this way, additional qualities accrue to the basic emotion, which 
thereby assumes a more particular meaning than it did initially.
The idea that a musical theme establishes or entails an emotional theme 
is hardly new: one can trace it back to the eighteenth century, where music 
was commonly viewed as analogous to rhetoric. In this view, the musical 
oration, no less than its linguistic counterpart, possesses a particular subject 
of interest, one that can be expressed and elaborated in manifold ways, 
both in terms of rhetorical tropes (elocutio) and in the sequence of ideas 
(dispositio). Such elaborations modify the emotional content of the subject 
(and, according to eighteenth–century theorists, arouse various passions in 
the auditor). Heinrich Koch, for example, claims the composer modifies the 
principal idea in order to “modify the feeling which he is treating” (1787, 
in Baker and Christensen 1995:188).22 That is, the principal idea defines the 
primary affect of the piece, and as the theme is developed, so is the affect 
with which it is associated.23 Later, he emphasizes that for a basic affect even 
to be sustained, it must be varied, presented in various guises. He states, “if 
the feeling is to become a pleasure, then the touching of these nerves must 
be continuous, indeed, must persist in differing strengths and weaknesses, 
that is, the feeling must be presented in various modifications . . . In short, 
the feeling will be continuous by our imagining it in several contexts” 
(ibid:202–203). In Koch’s view, to sustain an emotion is necessarily to vary 
it. Carl Dahlhaus confirms that the concept of a theme in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries entailed not just a musical but also an emotional 
idea—an affect or character—and that development is not solely of the 
musical idea but also of its emotional correlate. He declares, “the motivic 
working of the ‘formal theme’ will have a correlative in a growing elaboration 
of the ‘aesthetic theme’” (1991:125). 
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Returning to our Beethoven example, we can now more fully appreciate 
the precise manner in which it specifies its basic emotion of bellicose anger. 
Again, the theme establishes this emotion primarily by virtue of convention 
and contour. The theme is not so much developed as sequentially restated on 
the dominant (typical of a sentence structure). Correspondingly, its mood 
is not so much developed as counterpoised by the quiescent chorale. Then 
the theme and its anger begin to be developed in earnest. As the theme is 
subjected to formal unfolding, its emotion becomes increasingly imbued 
with musical substance, such that it becomes increasingly difficult to extricate 
the emotion from its musical context. In other words, as the music proceeds, 
it refers to the idea of anger less and embodies it more—the anger becomes 
more musically specific (we might even call it “musical anger”). Yet, at the 
same time, this formal unfolding exposes general states of sentient experi-
ence that in turn specify and modify the anger: what was initially bellicose 
anger becomes bellicose anger contemplated, then gradually resurging, then 
(almost) regressed to.
This example amply demonstrates that, contrary to Hanslick’s assertion 
that music “can only express the various accompanying adjectives and never 
the substantive”—emotional dynamics but not emotion per se—a basic 
emotion (in this case, bellicose anger) can effectively serve as the substan-
tive, the emotional subject that is adjectivally qualified by formal dynamics. 
In Hanslick’s model, even where discernible musical moods exist (and we 
have seen that Hanslick does unwittingly accede to such moods [see note 
15]), they would ultimately be subsumed by formal processes. That is, they 
would ultimately yield to abstract states that for him are synonymous with 
purely musical structure. For Hanslick, in other words, the purely musical 
(or something close to it) is the end result. By contrast, I am arguing that 
these formal processes never (or rarely) become independent of the theme 
and its corresponding emotion; they necessarily particularize this emotion, 
and in doing so acquire much of their interest and import. Put another way, 
I contend that in classic–romantic music, the emotional point of reference 
will not cease to hold sway in the course of development; rather, it will con-
tinue, even amidst the most dense developmental permutations, to provide 
a clearly defined emotional context in relation to which these permutations 
carry significance.24 This music almost always has an emotional subject (or 
several) which is susceptible to specification or predication.
Beethoven, Sonata, Op. 7, Second Movement
While we have considered the effect of formal processes and procedures upon 
musical emotion, we have yet to consider the effect of tonal structure, voice 
leading, and motivic relationships. An adequate theory of musical emotion 
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will need to account for these parameters as well, for music–emotional 
specificity derives not just from foreground thematic development but also 
from higher–level processes. Let us parse the opening of Beethoven’s Piano 
Sonata in Eb, op. 7, second movement (Example 2) from this standpoint.
I begin with a formal overview. This passage, the A section of a large 
ternary form, itself comprises a small ternary: A1, measures 1–8; B, pickup 
to 9–14; A2, 15–24. The small B section is distinguished by its own theme 
and key (the dominant). A2 is a variant and expansion of A1; the expansion 
is due mostly to an evaded cadence on the downbeat of measure 20 and a 
subsequent interpolation, as I will discuss in a moment. In terms of voice 
leading, as my graph in Example 3 shows, an E Kopfton (  
 	
ˆ 3 ) is prolonged 
within the A1 section by means of two third–progressions, one nested 
within the other.25 In the B section, the fundamental line is interrupted at 
  
 	
ˆ 2  (D2). A2, naturally, reinitiates the fundamental line—the Kopfton   
 	
ˆ 3 —
whose descent is once again obstructed by the aforementioned evaded ca-
dence into measure 20. The structural descent, when it finally arrives, is 
rather tenuous, given that the   
 	
ˆ 2  (measure 23) is merely implied (or perhaps 
can be seen to retreat into the alto voice, covered by the soprano’s G, as in 
measure 2. Beethoven reserves the decisive descent for the final two measures 
of the movement (the descent in measures 73–74 is not definitive since it is 
not in the obligatory register. More prominent and perceptible than the 
underlying descent in measures 22–23 is the leap from G1–C1 (measures 
23–24), by which the G is registrally abandoned; its thread is picked up in 
the large B section by Ab1 in measure 25 (this G–Ab motion serves to bridge 
the large A and B sections). 
As for an emotive overview, the governing topic appears to be Sensibility 
(Empfindsamkeit). The piece exemplifies many of the features Ratner cites 
as characteristic of this idiom: “interrupted continuity, elaborate orna-
mentation, pregnant pauses, shifting, uncertain, often dissonant harmony” 
(1980:22). Such features suggest a mercurial emotional disposition. More 
specifically, A1 is governed by a chorale–like topic, whose hushed chords 
couched within sighing figures (two–note slurs) suggest a gentle yearn-
ing—they are plaintive, but, because in the major mode, not morose. In B, 
the mood turns brighter due to the brighter key (the dominant tonicization), 
higher register, and increased rhythmic animation. If the A theme is listless 
and contemplative, the B theme is more lithe and outwardly expressive. A2, 
finally, is even more taciturn than the opening due to its pianissimo dynamic 
but quickly gains a sense of urgency and motion in measure 17, the precise 
point at which A2 deviates from A1. The evaded cadence in measure 20 is 
then immediately followed by audacious hammer strokes, which comprise 
the emotional apex of the entire passage (the large A section). This aggression 
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Example 2: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in Eb, Op. 7, second movement, measures 1–24
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is abruptly curbed, however, by a denouement that restores the serenity of 
the opening.
Each formal section, then, has its own distinctive emotional qualities, as 
defined by particular topics and contours. Now let us delve into greater detail, 
discussing for each section the finer, more localized emotions arising from 
conventions and contours; their specification by formal processes; and their 
specification by a few suggestive aspects of tonal and motivic structure.26 I 
will not attempt an exhaustive emotive analysis but will rather weave a few 
narrative threads I find particularly salient.
A1, measures 1–8
As I have already mentioned, the opening is a quasi–chorale partitioned 
into sigh–like figures, expressing a somewhat mournful quality. The pregnant 
pauses lend the persona a reticent character—she expresses her sorrow 
hesitantly, or perhaps merely contemplates it tacitly. The second measure 
presents a more overt sigh than does the first, in the form of a descend-
ing–fourth leap, G–D; a more solemn variant of this gesture, traversing a 
tritone, follows in the bass of measure 3. Moreover, the unexpected slide 
from V6/V to V 4/2 as well as the strident, sforzando–accented C appog-
giatura in measure 4 create an unsettling, even tragic ambiance. Hence, the 
passage thus far expresses ever more intense instances of melancholy as it 
proceeds. The variants of the basic emotion derive from, or correlate with, 
variants of the initial two–chord and G–D gestures. (Notice that the mo-
tivic variants engender an emotional progression—one of increasing inten-
sity or severity—even though formally the phrase is relatively static and 
paratactic.27) Then, the angst that culminates with the chromaticism and 
dissonance of measure 4 is assuaged by the pristine diatonicism of measures 
5–72. This reprieve is slightly soured, however, by Ab, (b  
 	
ˆ 6 , a byproduct of 
modal mixture) in the alto of measure 7, which is evocative of a pang, given 
its tonal coloration and abrupt off–beat accent. The section comes full circle 
with the sigh figure of measure 8, which, like that of the first measure, is 
wistful but relatively benign in comparison with the others encountered in 
this phrase. 
Now I will consider the tonal structure (Example 3) and its emotional 
implications. To begin, the G in m. 21 would seem to partake of a third 
motion: E–F–G (measures 1–2); yet I would contend that the G is actually 
a cover tone28 and thus has no direct syntactical connection to the F. Rather, 
an E–F–E neighbor motion underlies the first two measures (I hear the D 
in measure 2 as embellishing the F). This reading is substantiated by the 
bass of measures 1–2, whose unambiguous lower–neighbor motion can be 
seen to crystallize and mirror—in the senses of both reflect and invert—the 
underlying upper–neighbor motion of the right hand. It is also substanti-
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Example 3: voice–leading graph of measures 1–24
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ated by subsequent events. In the transition from B to A2, the Kopfton (E) 
is reintroduced by F. Even though F is part of a 8–7 passing motion, its 
octave–shift (measure 14) calls special attention to it as well as to the E to 
which it inevitably resolves. However, this resolution is somewhat equivocal: 
although F1 resolves directly to E1, F2 is left hanging. This pitch is not picked 
up until measure 18, where it finally resolves to E2. Hence, as the piece pro-
ceeds, F–E becomes increasingly explicit as a motive; this process, in turn, 
retroactively grants motivic status to the initial (E–)F–E of measures 1–2. 
If in the first two measures the conjoining of E and F (as an entity separate 
from the following G) is nebulous, subsequent events eventually clarify 
the relationship of these pitches, hypostatizing them as a distinct motive.29
Based on this analysis, one might say the G desires to be integrated into 
a linear framework. Stated more metaphorically, the G in measure 2 intimates 
a character who longs to belong in some sense but is prevented from doing 
so (at least for the moment). The character connoted by G desires greater 
ontological certainty—the kind of identity and security one enjoys as a 
member of a community. The voice–leading environment, as I see it, thus 
specifies both a particular musical agent experiencing the melancholy or 
distress (the G, which throughout the piece is framed as an outlier with 
respect to the   
 	
ˆ 3 –line Urlinie) and, more importantly, a reason for the mel-
ancholy: G is denied what it apparently seeks, which is to be more firmly 
entrenched in its surroundings. 
To summarize: the mood of melancholy as expressed by foreground 
conventions/contours is specified and rendered multidimensional by means 
of (a) the successive motivic transformations in measures 1–4, which render 
the melancholy increasingly intense; and (b) middleground structure, which 
establishes a context by which one can attribute the melancholy to a persona, 
and by which one can adduce a reason for the melancholy. The structure 
connotes both an agent and a circumstance by which that persona would 
possess a particular frame of mind, a desire. The outcome is no generic 
melancholy; rather, it is melancholy in response to frustrated desire.
B, measures 8–14
This section establishes a fresh, somewhat more buoyant mood since, in 
contrast to the previous section, it is fluid rather than halting: rests no longer 
abound and the melody, in a singing style, is marked by greater rhythmic 
heterogeneity and vivacity. Also, measure 9, preceded by an animating 
anacrusis, is itself anacrusic in relation to measure 10. As a result, the theme 
has a leading, directional quality, in marked contrast to the static, down-
beat–oriented opening theme. Moreover, the open spacing of the right–hand 
chords in measures 9 and 11 creates a sense of expectancy, a raised–eyebrow 
physiognomy expressing (cautious) optimism. Relatedly, the ascent of the 
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upper voice in measures 10–12 through G2 and B2—accented by a sforzando 
and in a high, conspicuous register—suggests a more assertive, even slightly 
fanfarish quality. However, this relative extroversion is somewhat countered 
by the cadenza–like ruminations of measures 10 and the last beat of 12. G2 
and B2, moreover, never continue to D3 as one might expect on the basis 
that (per Leonard Meyer) the initiation of a triad implies its completion. 
Rather, measure 14 ascends merely to F2, undermining the tonicity and 
brighter mood of G major. Thus the register is noticeably curbed, connoting 
emotional inhibition and waning optimism.
Such inhibition is also evident in the manner in which this section 
formally unfolds. The first four measures seem to initiate a sentence: given 
that measures 9–10 state a basic idea and measures 11–12 its (partially) 
sequential variant, we might well expect a four–measure continuation, along 
the somewhat crude lines of Example 4.30 This expectation is provisionally 
fulfilled in measures 13–141, especially given their harmonic acceleration 
(which Caplin [1998] cites as characteristic of a continuation). This expecta-
tion, however, is thwarted by the “premature” arrival in measure 14 of V7, 
which results in a foreshortened subphrase (two measures instead of four). 
This truncated phrase rhythm reinforces and is reinforced by the registral 
containment of the right hand, and both, in turn, dampen the elevated mood 
with which this section began.  
This section, then, initially expresses a more positive mood than does 
the previous one, as evident in the contoural elements of rhythmic animation 
and spacious voicings, and the convention of fanfare, followed by a dejection 
of mood based on registral and formal curtailment. This reading is substan-
tiated by tonal and motivic considerations. The G, which in the previous 
section had trouble finding a niche, is now the local tonic as well as the 
focal point in the bass, where it repeated as part of an A–G motion that 
replicates that of the tenor voice in measures 6–7 (as shown by the arrow in 
Example 2). There the figure was quickly undermined by Ab (b  
 	
ˆ 6 ); here it 
revels in an unproblematic presentation and the   
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  is offered as an antidote 
to the pessimism of b  
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  (both versions of the motive are highlighted in 
Example 3). Yet, this figure returns in measure 133.31 This Ab, however, is 
less turbulent than the one in measure 7 since it exhibits greater rhythmic 
regularity and control—the chromatic line in which it participates unfolds 
with greater composure.
To summarize, the initial treatment of A–G supports and specifies the 
cautious optimism and extroversion of the right hand, providing a reason 
for it—the G has found a raison d’être, if only for the moment—and   
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  is 
proffered as a corrective to b  
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5 . By contrast, the injection of Ab in measure 
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13 communicates the dejection connoted by the formal and registral contrac-
tion of the next measure. The motivic interplay between   
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  and b  
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  
mirrors and reinforces the emotional transformation as exhibited by surface 
contours and conventions.
A2, measures 15–24
The melodic lead–in to this section (measure 14, second and third beats), 
by means of its tripping gesture, dissipates the tension that had arisen due 
to the resurgence of the b  
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  motive. The statement of the theme that 
follows is more reticent than that in A1, perhaps in response to the extrover-
sion of B, as if the melancholy subject is taken aback by her own momentary 
assuredness.32 This diffidence, however, is promptly reversed by an unex-
pected deviation from A1 in the form of a “premature” statement of the 
descending–fourth leap in measure 17. That is, here two such figures occur 
in consecutive measures (16 and 17), whereas in A1 the second figure 
(measure 4) was separated from the first (measure 2) by an entire measure. 
This surprise, enhanced by the rinforzando, in turn precipitates a marked 
increase in rhythmic and harmonic activity in the form of an ascending 5–6 
sequence. The onset of this sequence induces a brief metric shift: as shown 
in Example 5, the second beat of measure 17 is heard as a downbeat—due 
both to the previous descending–fourth gesture arising prematurely, thus 
possessing an anacrusic quality, and to a fresh rhythmic idea starting on 
that second beat.
The sequence leads to the right–hand sigh figure, F–E in measure 18, 
which is intensely sorrowful, especially given the tense sonority—a full–di-
minished seventh chord, a viio7/vi—of which the F is part, not to mention the 
deceptive motion on which the measure ends. This gesture is the emotional 
apotheosis of the F–E neighbor motive I have discussed. This reading is both 
supported and qualified by the undercutting motive that follows in the left 
hand; as Example 6 demonstrates, measures 18–20 in a sense recompose 
measures 1–4. Yet the undercutting motive here is considerably softened, 
in three ways. First, though starting out in the lowest–sounding voice, the 
figure becomes absorbed by the tenor. Second, the figure is diluted by the G 
Example 4: hypothetical continuation phrase in the B section (starting measure 13)
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that intervenes between F# and Fn, which eviscerates what was initially direct 
chromaticism. Finally, the F# is approached from A rather than from C as 
in A1, thus forming a milder minor third in contrast to the strident tritone. 
Hence, whereas the undercutting figure in A1 intensified the melancholy, 
the one in A2 mitigates it. However, this dark mood is restored forthwith: 
in measure 20, the previously missing tritone now returns in the form of 
the soprano’s leap from G–C#. The undercutting, previously attenuated, 
returns with a vengeance, in the form of an evaded cadence that alights on 
vii 4/2 of ii, a tensely enigmatic sonority to say the least.33 (This dark turn 
is immediately presaged by the funereal dotted rhythms of measure 19). 
The hammer blows that follow in measures 20 and 21 are shocking 
as much due to the pregnant pauses by which they are framed as to the 
stentorian sonorities themselves. The exclamatory, intrusive demeanor of 
these chords derives not only from their fortissimo dynamic and rhythmic 
rigidity but also from the formal context in which they occur: these chords 
are part of an interpolation, an inserted module (in relation to A1) that 
extends from the evaded cadence in measure 201 to the end of measure 23 
(see the brackets in Example 2). Hence, measures 20–21 constitute not only 
a dynamic interjection but a formal one as well. This outburst is promptly 
pacified, however, by the resumption in measure 22 of a pianissimo chord 
progression and by a repetition and resolution of the cadence initially evaded 
(the G–C# leap is peaceably converted to G–Cn). However, the repetition of 
the solemn, funereal figure as well as the inconclusiveness of the lingering 
G (the subterranean resolution of the fundamental line notwithstanding) 
suggest that the persona is mollified only in the sense of coming to terms 
with her grief. That is, she accepts it rather than lashes out against it as she 
had in measures 20–21; but the grief is not extinguished. 
Example 5: metric displacement in A2
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In short, the foreground in A2 expresses in turn taciturn melancholy, 
waxing confidence and optimism, ambivalent anguish, funereal grief, 
bellicose defiance, and finally equivocal repose. In no other section of this 
movement is the governing empfindsam aesthetic and mercurial sensibility 
more patent.
Regarding structural processes, the G of measure 16 is assimilated by a 
full–fledged line, as shown in Examples 2 and 3: whereas the G of measure 
2 was left hanging, it now continues upward to the A in measure 17 (which 
is conspicuous for the reasons already mentioned), initiating the 5–6 se-
quence, the upper line of which then transfers to the tenor voice. Hence, 
what was in measure 2 an isolated, alienated tone is now a bona fide mem-
ber of a melodic line. This moment thus represents an actualization, a real-
ization of G’s desire to become linearly integrated—G finds a connection, 
musically and metaphorically, with other entities—initially with A and then, 
in turn, with the broader line that G–A relation initiates.34 The positive 
emotion also derives from the fact that G’s connection with A resonates with 
the A–G,   
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  motive. Only now, rather than A descending to G, a figure 
that, as we have seen, is susceptible to a dour b  
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  inflection, G ascends to 
A, a figure much less susceptible to an emotional downturn. This contoural 
reversal, then, signifies an emotional reversal. Also symptomatic of emo-
tional reversal is that the bass’s G# in measure 18, part of the ascending 
chromatic 5–6 sequence, is arguably an enharmonic respelling of Ab, b  
 	
ˆ 6 , 
such that what had been a morose Ab–G is now a much more hopeful G#–A. 
Example 6: measures 18–19 as recomposition of measures 1–5
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This reversal is also evident on a broader scale when we consider the transi-
tion from this large A section to the large B that follows it: as shown in 
Example 3, the G in measure 19, at least at the foreground, is left hang-
ing—it is registrally abandoned. But ultimately finds a home in the Ab that 
begins the large B. This inverted statement of the b  
 	
ˆ 6 –  
 	
ˆ 5  motive and the 
emotional reversal it intimates is a crucial impetus for the much more ebul-
lient demeanor of the large B.
If G is momentarily actualized, given a sense of purpose and belonging 
by the unexpected, beneficent A (the emotional impetus, perhaps, behind A’s 
rinforzando), a metric element is actualized as well. Recall that the second 
beat of measure 17 initiates a metric displacement; this can be construed 
as reframing the previously accented second beats (measures 4, 10, and 12) 
as a downbeat, as if they had aspired to downbeat–status all along. In other 
words, this moment actualizes the potential or desire of those rhythmic ac-
cents to become full–fledged metric accents. This event is arguably a metric 
counterpart to the integration of G: both the G and the second beat begin 
as ancillaries to structure (tonal and metric, respectively) but are ultimately 
transformed into integral components of structure.35 Measure 17, then, is 
the culmination and resolution of both tonal and metric processes, and thus 
serves to motivate and substantiate the confidence, if ephemeral, suggested 
by the foreground. 
Measure 18, on the other hand, evinces a discrepancy between the 
foreground topic and the broader structural process: the mournful character 
of the F–E sigh figure is mitigated not only by the bass’s G#–A, as discussed, 
and the subsequently softened undercutting, but also by the fact that F–E 
is a fulfillment of sorts. That is, the E2 is a resolution of the F2 neighbor left 
hanging at the end of the B section, as shown by the arrow in Example 2.36 
Topic and voice leading once again converge at the hammer strokes: the 
disruptive effect of these gestures is substantiated by and in part results 
from the voice leading. As the graph indicates, G (measure 21) is no longer 
neatly integrated into a continuous line. That was possible in measures 16 
ff. due to the homogeneity of the sequential voice leading, where all notes 
were at the same level; here the G is clearly subordinate to, a passing tone in 
relation to, the surrounding F and A (the predominant is being composed 
out). Interestingly, the soprano in measures 20–22 can be read as recalling 
the bass line of measures 17–18, with slight modifications—it excludes 
the chromatic tones. This line too is dissolved (see brackets in Example 
3). Hence, the sequential progression of measures 16–18 is subsequently 
dissolved, in terms of both underlying voice leading and surface rhythmic 
fragmentation. Such dissolution can be construed as a hostile response to 




The above analysis demonstrates how emotional conventions and contours 
are modified and specified not just by thematic development and formal 
processes—phrase expansion or foreshortening, sequences, metric displace-
ment, and so on—but also by tonal structure and voice leading, motivic 
interrelations, and melodic implications/realizations. That is, the structural 
refinement of basic moods is not only diachronic but also synchronic; it 
occurs not only in horizontal space, as the foreground linearly unfolds, but 
also in vertical (hierarchical) space, as a result of the foreground interact-
ing with, perceived in relation to, deeper, concurrent levels of structure. 
Diachronically, a basic emotion is specified by the dynamic form it as-
sumes, a form that predicates various attributes about its emotive subject. 
Synchronically, the basic emotion is specified by higher–level processes. 
The latter, metaphorically construed, yield states of mind, beliefs, attitudes, 
and desires that lend both cognitive complexity and situational specificity 
to emotions denoted by foreground signifiers. Musical emotions, in short, 
grow more specific and complex not only as the music unfolds in time 
but also as one delves into structural strata, as one uncovers the structural 
context of particular events.
In closing, I want to reemphasize that tonal and other structural pro-
cesses do not necessarily conform to and confirm the emotional content 
of the foreground, but can imply a different, even opposing emotion. For 
examples of confirmation, we saw how the melancholy of the opening 
was created not just topically but also structurally—by the lack of linear 
connection. We also saw how the striving optimism of measure 17 was 
created not just by the energetic gestures at the foreground but also by the 
fulfillment of long–awaited tonal and metric promises. In these two cases, 
structural processes support and specify the comparatively vague emotional 
implications of the foreground by furnishing musical metaphors for mental 
attitudes or states of belief (“I desire to belong to something”; “I am now part 
of something”). Such mental states are arguably necessary components of 
an emotionally complex experience. For an example of incongruity, recall 
measure 18, whose sadness, as expressed by the sigh figure, is mitigated or 
countered by several factors, especially by the E2 providing a long–range 
resolution of F2. The voice leading here connotes a positive emotional state 
at odds with the pathos of the surface. In cases such as this, one might 
contend that surface and structure offer mutually exclusive emotional 
scenarios one must choose between. Alternatively, and I think preferably, 
one might contend that multiple and conflicting emotional strata coexist, 
engendering irreducible emotional ambiguity. One might view such music 
as indicative of a psychologically conflicted and complex persona, one that 
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feels a particular emotion on one level of consciousness, a different or even 
antithetical emotion on another.
Whether structural processes amplify the emotions of the musical sur-
face or, conversely, suggest emotional nuances at odds with them, one thing 
is clear: Schenkerian, motivic, and other analytical methods, in revealing and 
parsing a piece’s structural complexity, also potentially provide a window 
into its music–emotional complexity. They afford us a glimpse beyond the 
often simple or basic emotions derived from foreground features into the 
more subtle tinges and subtexts that derive from non–obvious structural 
relations. Indeed, inviting these methodologies into music–emotional ex-
egesis is advantageous precisely because they have the capacity to elucidate 
a music–emotional experience more nuanced than Kivy’s “garden–variety” 
types;37 this is because they connote the mental states that are integral com-
ponents of specific emotions. By teasing out the experiential intimations of 
structural processes, one can more readily see how music is proximate to 
and expressive of our lived emotional experience.
Notes
This essay is based upon talks delivered in the fall of 2007 at Stanford University and Drury 
University. I thank Kumaran Arul and George Barth for inviting me to speak at the former, 
Christopher Koch at the latter. I also thank Scott Burnham, Kevin Korsyn, and Wayne Petty 
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. The most ardent proponent of this view in recent scholarship is Kivy (1989); other “anti–
arousalists” include Tischler (1972), Goodman (1976), Davies (1994), and Goldman (1995). 
Perhaps one of the earliest anti–arousalists was Johann Mattheson, on whose viewpoint Kivy 
(1993a) expounds.
2. Budd (1985:63) notes an exception: when the listener is sad or angry about the piece itself 
for some reason (such as its perceived poor quality). In such a case, the piece would be the 
intentional object, albeit not an aesthetically relevant one.
3. Karl and Robinson (1997) (whose phrase I borrow) and Levinson (1990) both argue for 
this thesis.
4. A caveat regarding Beethoven’s music, on which I will focus in this paper: many themes 
of Beethoven’s middle period are not at all the melodically distinctive, self–contained mod-
ules of earlier classical music, but rather relatively generic, consisting of primordial musical 
material. Recall the themes of the openings of the “Eroica” Symphony and “Appassionata” 
Sonata, for example—both consist of mere arpeggiated triads. Adorno (1988:23, passim), 
for one, attributes this phenomenon to Beethoven’s proclivity in the middle period toward 
organic unity and processuality. Beethoven de–particularizes themes in order to give them 
over to the totality, to submit them to a thoroughgoing developmental process. Yet, I would 
suggest, most of the middle–style themes, even if not musically distinct and self–contained, 
are nonetheless emotionally distinct enough to serve as emotional points of reference. The 
opening motto of the Fifth Symphony is a case in point: thematically no more than an 
impetus for further motion and development, emotionally it is a rather concrete point of 




5. In Adorno’s typology (1962:5), “structural hearing” is practiced by the “expert” listener. 
Structural hearing, in my view, does not require specialized, technical knowledge but merely 
a capacity to store musical events in memory, to hear them in relation to previous ones—in 
short, to hold them in a state of “conceptual tension” (to invoke Schenker’s term [1926, 
passim]).
6. This view, which affords the listener/reader an indispensable role in the meaning–making 
process, strongly resonates with the reader–response theory of Wolfgang Iser (1978).
7. Kivy does not deal extensively with topics; for a general introduction, see Allanbrook 
(1983:31–70) and Ratner (1980:9–29). Incidentally, topics, like the major and minor modes, 
may also generate broad expressive contexts. Robert Hatten notes, for example, that in the 
first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, Op. 101, the Pastoral is “the fundamental topical 
premise coordinating formal features and expression” (Hatten 1994:92).
8. The expressiveness of musical contours, Kivy argues (1989:172 ff.), also derives from our 
strong “animistic” tendencies, which in turn derive from basic survival instincts and are thus 
evolutionarily advantageous.
9. Davies (1994:201–278) similarly submits that music presents not felt emotion but “emotion 
characteristics in appearances”; that is, music utilizes the same primary expressions of feeling 
as operate in people. Small (1998, passim) expresses a related view: that music expresses emo-
tions not directly but rather through the physical gestures with which emotions are associated. 
10. Perceiving music as evocative of speech depends in no small measure upon performance, 
especially regarding articulation. The eighteenth century witnessed a significant shift in the 
manner by which performers conveyed a linguistic sensibility. Barth (1992:38 ff.) recounts how 
the “syllabic nonlegato” of C. P. E. Bach and Mozart gave way to Beethoven’s predominately 
legato touch. While the latter would seem far less conducive to a declamatory style than the 
localized articulation and pianistic punctuation of earlier composers, in fact, Beethoven’s 
“cherished innovations—the legato style, the slurs that more frequently crossed bar lines to 
subsume points of arrival, the lengthy passages of unarticulated figuration” (47)—became 
means of conveying larger dramatic arcs. Beethoven sublated the periodicity of eighteenth 
century rhetoric, preserving it but on a higher level, one compatible with his grander struc-
tural proportions. His use of legato less often conveyed long–lined lyricism than “dramatic 
breadth” (45). 
11. Gioseffo Zarlino, who was perhaps the first to characterize the major triad as happy 
(“allegro”) and the minor triad as sad (“mesto”), derives these affective qualities less from 
static, physiognomic aspects than from mobile, gestural ones. As recounted by Dahlhaus 
(1990:235), Zarlino supported these associations by “a psychological interpretation [of the] 
rule of thirds and sixths,” by which major thirds and sixths derive their ebullient quality 
from their tendency to expand, to fifths and octaves, respectively, while minor thirds and 
sixths derive their melancholy quality from their tendency to contract, to unisons and fifths, 
respectively. I would add that the dialectical or dualistic theorists, such as Moritz Hauptmann 
and Hugo Riemann, similarly ascribed the sadness of minor to a dynamic quality, if one less 
pronounced than Zarlino’s—to the fact that the minor triad, as the inversion of a major triad, 
is generated from the top down; in Hauptmann’s words, it expresses “not upward driving 
force, but downward drawing weight . . . . We therefore find in the minor chord the expres-
sion for mourning, the hanging boughs of the weeping willow,” The Nature of Harmony and 
Meter, his italics; translated in Mickelsen (1977:13).
12. Meyer (1973:214) similarly posits a fluid boundary between melodic “archetypes,” which 
are based on melodic contour and syntax, and melodic “schemata,” which are based on con-
ventional use. In fact, he no sooner establishes this dichotomy than dissolves it, conjoining 
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the two terms: “archetypal schemata.” 
13. Sulzer (1774) claims that “every passion is actually a series of moving impressions” and 
“there are passions in which impressions flow evenly like a gentle brook . . . [others] which 
flow onward faster and with more turbulence. In a few the succession of impressions rush 
forward as if a raging stream” (in Baker and Christensen 1995:52). However, unlike Hanslick, 
he does not deny that music can express particular emotions; in fact, he seems to suggest 
that music can do so precisely by representing the motions with which particular emotions 
are associated.
14. Robinson (1987) likewise argues that music can describe an object but not depict it—that 
it can posit a predicate but not a subject.
15. Kivy (1993c) detects a telling inconsistency in Hanslick’s argument. At one point, Hanslick 
(1891:17–19) invokes Gluck’s famous aria “Che farò senza Euridice!” from Orfeo ed Euridice, 
noting that the music, though on its face appropriate to the grief expressed by the text, upon 
reflection proves not to be sad enough, such that, in fact, it could be used for a text expressing 
the opposite emotion: gaiety. From this situation—not an uncommon one among eighteenth–
century composers, who often reused music to set emotionally disparate texts—Hanslick 
concludes that music possesses no definite emotion, for if it did, it would not be amenable 
to such multi–use. However, as Kivy notes, Hanslick’s argument is self–contradictory, since, 
in the case of “Che farò,” Hanslick seems initially to have implied that the music does indeed 
have an inherent, specific emotional quality (happiness) independent from and contrary 
to that of the text. Kivy ultimately concludes that Hanslick, despite himself, accedes to the 
possibility of particular emotions in music. 
16. We might liken Langer’s processes to Johnson’s (1987) “embodied image schemata,” 
which are schemata derived from somatic experience, from our physical interaction with 
the world around us, and which are metaphorically extended to serve as models for inter-
nal, cognitive and emotional, experience. As defined by Zbikowski, the image schema “is a 
dynamic cognitive construct that functions somewhat like the abstract structure of an image 
and thereby connects together a vast range of different experiences that manifest this same 
recurring structure” (2002:68). 
17. Meyer (1956:19) subscribes to this view as well, claiming that affect is inherently undiffer-
entiated and can only be differentiated by a situational context, which music cannot provide. 
18. By contrast, the theme as stated in the previous, orchestral exposition is emotionally 
milder, due to its piano dynamic and lack of sforzando on the G. In fact, we would probably 
attribute anger (or more precisely, subdued or latent anger) to this earlier passage only in 
retrospect—on the basis of its more overt appearance in the solo piano.
19. Sulzer (1774) states “All that is . . . serious, thoughtful . . . requires long phrases; the 
cheerful as well as the furious [require] very short phrases.” Quoted in Ratner (1980:174).
20. As a whole, this nine–measure passage of the second exposition (measures 122–130) is a 
slight expansion of the corresponding eight–measure passage of the first exposition (measures 
9–16), as it augments the cadential progression of measure 15 to two measures (128–129). 
Hence, the local expansion (of the two–measure model) results from acceleration, the global 
expansion (of the first exposition) from ritardation. 
21. In a sonata form, this will often happen right away, prior to the development section 
proper Schoenberg states:
There is development everywhere in a piece of music, especially in the first division [i.e., 
the exposition], where a number of themes are developed from a basic motive. Nothing can 
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remain without being elaborated or worked out. What happens in this second division [i.e., 
the development] is something different. Themes of the first division and their derivatives 
are found in a constant modulatory movement through many . . . [tonal] regions” (Schoen-
berg 1948:145). 
For Schoenberg, what characterizes the development section is not thematic development 
per se, not developing variation as occurs in the exposition, but placing themes in various 
tonal environments. For this reason, he prefers for this section the term Durchführung: 
“which means that the themes which have not modulated in the first division are now [led 
through] contrasting regions in a modulatory procedure” (ibid.). One can trace back this 
stance toward development further still, indeed to the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century with Antoine Reicha’s grande coupe binaire, a nascent formulation of what became 
known as sonata form. As documented by Hoyt (1996), Reicha adopted a very broad view 
of “développement,” applying it to almost any modification the musical idea receives, which 
can happen anywhere in the form.
22. Koch’s basic views on musical emotion—regarding the emotions music can elicit, the 
circumstances under which music can elicit them, how the composer can access them, and 
so on—are found throughout this section, especially pp. 144–57 (Baker and Christensen 
1995). Incidentally, McCreless (2002) notes that, in the late eighteenth century, the centuries 
long connection between music and rhetoric began to dissolve. In particular, with the rise 
of the galant style and its emphasis upon tangible affects, the music–rhetorical figures (Fig-
urenlehre) took a back seat; in other words, with the shift from a mimetic to an expressive 
aesthetic, figures became obsolete. However, Johann Forkel, among other theorists, attempted 
to preserve at least some components of rhetoric, in particular the notion of the subject of an 
oration. Indeed, as McCreless (2002:873) observes, “Late eighteenth–century compositional 
theory is full of discussions of the Idee, Gedanke, Thema, or motivo.”
23. Within Koch’s framework, the principal ideas are devised in the initial, planning [Anlage] 
phase, their modifications in the realization [Ausführung] phase.
24. To be accurate, Hanslick at one point actually comes close to articulating essentially this 
very point: “Everything in the structure is a spontaneous continuation and consequence of 
the theme, conditioned and shaped by it . . . . The composer puts the theme, like the principal 
character in a novel, into different situations and surroundings, in varying occurrences and 
moods—these and all the rest, no matter how sharply contrasted, are thought and shaped 
with reference to it” (1891:82). Once again, we detect some ambivalence on Hanslick’s part.
25. Forte and Gilbert (1982:139) read measures 3–4 as forming a local interruption on   
 	
ˆ 2  
(in measure 3, then prolonged in the following measure). I do not think an interruption is 
viable here since the   
 	
ˆ 2  is not supported by a root–position dominant. The bass in these 
measures, in fact, is so chromatically unstable and fluid (with a progression of F#–Fn–E) as 
to promote unbroken continuity into measure 5. 
26. In examining the interaction of topics and other foreground emotional signifiers with 
Schenkerian structure, I will employ a methodology similar though not identical to Agawu 
(1991). In a more general way, my approach is also indebted to Cone (1986), Hatten (1994), 
Maus (1997), and Klein (2004), to cite four of the more celebrated studies exploring the 
intersection of musical structure and meaning.
27. Both Schoenberg (1948:115) and Caplin (1998:76–77) read this phrase as a more tightly 
knit, linear unit—as a sentence, wherein measures 1–2 comprise the basic idea, 3–4 its vari-
ant, and 5–8 the continuation. However, given how fragmented the events are due to the 
pregnant pauses and slow tempo, I do not hear this phrase as a sentence; even if such a form 
applies theoretically, I do not think it is relevant perceptually. In particular, it is quite dif-
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ficult to perceive measures 1–2 as a single module (the basic idea) since the figures in those 
respective measures are so isolated and distant.
28. Or rather, I was thus persuaded by an anonymous reader, whom I thank. 
29. Cadwallader (1988) supplies several examples of this phenomenon—where initial fore-
ground motivic ambiguity is eventually resolved or clarified by middleground structure—in 
the late piano music of Brahms. 
30. The B section of Robert Schumann’s Albumblatt in F# minor (from his Bunte Blätter, Op. 
99, and on which Brahms composed his Variations, op. 9) is remarkably similar to Beethoven’s 
B section: both feature partial melodic sequences in which a triadic arpeggiation is promised 
but not fulfilled (Elsewhere [2012], I have demonstrated how Brahms’s variations actualize 
the foiled arpeggiation in the theme). Yet, unlike Beethoven’s B section, Schumann’s does 
in fact delineate a sentence.
31. Interestingly, if the bass’s Ab–G (measures 13–14) recalls the alto of measure 7, the bass’s 
larger A–Ab–G motion recalls the alto’s F#–Fn–E of measure 4 (see arrow in Example 2). 
Both have an undermining, or, at Robert Hatten terms it, “undercutting” quality (on this 
trope generally and its use in Beethoven’s op. 101 in particular, see Hatten [1994:99–100]).
32. Or by someone else’s, if we construe the B section to represent another persona. I think 
one of the central narrative ambiguities in wordless music generally is whether salient musi-
cal contrasts and oppositions are more indicative of conflicts between personae or rather of 
conflicting psychological states within a single persona. Though in a few rare cases certain 
factors might suggest one more than the other, I think the matter is usually ambiguous, and 
it certainly is here. 
33. Chopin uses a V 4/2 of bII in measure 72 of the Nocturne in C Minor, opus 48, no. 1 to 
similar effect, except Chopin’s chord, rendered fortissimo and placed at the apex of a quick 
crescendo, undercuts in a brazen manner, in contrast to Beethoven’s cryptic one.
34. Meyer (1973) would probably consider the G in measure 2 a “potentiality,” in that its 
melodic prominence, as part of a salient sigh figure, is at odds with its lack of structural 
importance. This disparity, precisely because it is so conspicuous, suggests the potential 
for congruence between the melodic and structural domains; this potential is realized in 
measures 17 ff. I regard this actualization, like most, as having an empowering, positive 
emotional connotation.
35. This narrative of integration also applies to Ab, b  
 	
ˆ 6 , which appears twice in this section 
as a chromatic outlier. The large B section starting in measure 25, whose key is Ab major, 
might be seen to integrate and centralize the Ab—this is yet another basis for this section’s 
aura of repose and contentment.
36. The motion from F2 to E2 within measure 14 is, of course, no true resolution, for this E 
is merely a passing tone within a G7 sonority and is subsumed by the octave coupling F2–F1.
37. In this, I am in fundamental agreement with Anthony Newcomb, who, moreover, attributes 
Kivy’s stance to a linguistic predilection among aestheticians “to discuss the expressivity of 
music only in simple, very general expressive predicates” and admonishes against reducing 
music–emotional possibilities “to the decidedly unrich repertory of basic expressive concepts 
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